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ROMAN STADNICKI
INTRODUCTION: URBAN ACTORS PUT TO 
THE TEST BY THE EGYPTIAN TRANSITION1
Translated from French by Thibaud Smerko
T 
hree years have passed since the 2011 revolution led 
to the fall of the Mubarak regime. This lapse of time 
has given the contributors to Egypte Monde Arabe 
enough perspective to see more clearly through the 
events and players of the transition in Egypt. Speciically, this new issue 
is dedicated to urban players – government authorities, planners, and 
citizens –, their inclusion in the mechanisms of change set in motion in 
2011, their repositioning on the professional and political scenes, and 
their new modi operandi.
With hopes to reassess urban dynamics in light of the major political 
and social changes that have shaken Egypt since the 2011 revolution, 
this issue reports on the mutation of urban action and the “imaginary 
urban planner”2 in one of Egypt’s most critical periods in recent history.
1. The author would like to thank Leïla Vignal (Rennes II University) and 
Pierre-Arnaud Barthel (Marne-La-Vallée University) for their valuable help 
throughout the long editorial process. Bernard Rougier (Director of the 
CEDEJ), Thibaud Smerko, who read over and translated some of the articles, 
Rana Kotb, Maha Galal, Anne-Elise Jolicard, Samuël Poisson, and Hala Bay-
oumi also contributed to making this issue possible. A very warm thanks to 
them, as well as my colleagues for their help in evaluating the articles.
2. “By “changing imaginary urban planner” (“imaginaire aménageur” in 
French), we mean all new and open representations, meanings, pervasively 
present or recurring ideas, references, and orientations, etc., implicit or ex-
plicit, contradictory but complementary, which now appear to be structuring 
urban practices” (Chalas, 2004).
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Before delving into the heart of the matter, we will focus on the 
current Egyptian urban context in which local players take part, rethink 
their strategies and tactics, occasionally express resistance, and engage 
in their various struggles.
CITIES REFLECT THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL 
CRISES EGYPT HAS BEEN GOING THROUGH SINCE 2011
The postrevolutionary period is synonymous with decision-making 
inertia with regard to urban planning3. Even though improving living 
conditions in urban areas was one of the demands of the 2011 protests, 
urbanization remained a matter of secondary concern during the 
legislative and presidential campaigns of 2011 and 20124. Subsequently, 
as part of their electoral platform, the Muslim Brotherhood would be 
castigated by the urban community as a whole (inhabitants, urban 
planners and architects, NGOs) for, on the one hand, having stayed 
the course of neoliberal policies implemented by Mubarak, and, on the 
other hand, for having encouraged the creation of regional inequalities. 
This criticism appears to be a result of unfulilled election promises 
to improve transportation, the cancellation of municipal elections, 
opaque low-income housing policies5, and coercive measures taken 
towards the inhabitants of informal areas, etc. It was not until the return 
of the army to the political arena, in the summer of 2013, that we 
witnessed the reactivation of major infrastructure projects: highways, 
bridges, roads, the construction of social housing, etc. Replacing the 
relevant ministries (Ministry of Housing, Ministry of Local development, 
etc.), in January 2014, the army even signed an agreement with the 
public agency in charge of informal settlements (Informal Settlements 
Development Fund) in cooperation with the Governorates of Cairo 
and Giza, to disburse 350 million Egyptian pounds6 to rehabilitate 
thirty “slums” in one year. These projects are carried out by companies 
with direct or indirect ties to the Egyptian army, without any bidding 
3. Estimated at 60-70%, the share of the Egyptian urban population living 
in self-built and non-regulatory areas (Sims, 2010) shows that government 
action in this area before the revolution must also be qualiied. Almost ex-
clusively engaged in the construction of private and secure new cities in the 
desert, supposed to decongest the capital, government action by Sadat and 
Mubarak has been, at best, able to provide basic services a posteriori (elec-
tricity and water) in some these informal settlements, at worst to “invisibilize” 
or to destroy installations produced claiming the route of road infrastructure 
(highways and urban ring road), or invoking health or natural hazards.
4. Kardoush, Hutchinson, 2012.
5. For more on this topic, see Yahia Shawkat’s article in this issue.
6. Approximately 36 million Euros.
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process, thus putting the army at the heart of Egypt’s development and 
reconstruction strategy7.
Beyond this government inaction in urban policy during the 2011-
2013 timeframe, most of the players involved in the development of 
Egypt – whether public or private –, bore the full brunt of the country’s 
political upheaval. Besides the high turnover issue in the relevant 
ministries (Housing, Transport, Environment, etc…) and governorates, 
Egypt’s oficial planning agency (General Ofice for Physical Planning) 
was also forced to replace a large number of its upper level staff after 
their resignation and/or dismissal, thus preventing the implementation 
of various master plans produced by this institution before and after the 
revolution.
Beyond the intricacies of the country’s political transition, a major 
economic crisis has impacted urban constructions. The 25% drop in 
proits8 in 2011 of Arab Contractors – the main state-owned construction 
and real estate company – exempliies the dificulties faced by irms in 
this sector after the revolution. Similarly, the large Egyptian real estate 
companies (Sodic, Ehaf, Bahgat Group, Orascom, etc.) complain of 
signiicant delays in the implementation of real estate projects, like the 
new Westown and Eastown neighbourhoods, located in the new cities 
of 6th of October and New Cairo, respectively, on the outskirts of Cairo. 
Price inlation of building materials9 and soaring land prices increase 
the effects of the crisis on property developers. With their usual contacts 
at the head of the state now replaced and the increased complexity of 
their relationship with high-level oficials (disputes over the land zoning 
for example) such companies have been forced to change strategies.
Finally, the major cities of Egypt today carry many marks of a post-
revolutionary period dominated by street clashes and a strong military 
presence in the city: damaged buildings, the presence of tanks and 
barricades, stone walls preventing rallies, closed intersections, etc. 
Cities, especially their centres, have become arenas for showdowns 
between police and citizens. This has resulted in a broadening spectrum 
of the urban struggle in the country (shifting confrontations, new forms 
of urban dissent, broadening the scope of activism, etc.)10.
7. Talon, 2013.
8. Oxford Business Group, 2012.
9. The cost of steel increased 5.6% from 2011 to 2012, and the cost of ce-




MULTIDIMENSIONAL CRISES DO NOT DISRUPT THE MAIN 
FORM OF URBAN PRODUCTION, I.E., UNREGULATED 
URBANISATION 
Taking full advantage of the decline in political control in the 
months that followed the revolution, the «refuge» provided by the in-
formal economy, and, to an even greater extent, the real estate market 
in a time of economic crisis, some residents seem to have developed 
new self-organisational capacities11. This is particularly the case in the 
ields of construction, trade, and transport in informal areas but also 
outside. In Cairo, the increase in the number of minibuses that do not 
pay taxes, as well as the proliferation of street vendors, is not conined 
to the informal areas alone. Indeed, there has been a spread of infor-
mal economic activity in the entire metropolitan area, particularly in 
the city centre and around Tahrir Square (increase of street vendors, 
return of the illegal tuk-tuk scooters to the Governorate of Cairo, etc.), 
a paradox, considering the signiicant presence of the Armed Forces in 
these areas.
However, few accurate studies and little data exist regarding the ex-
pansion of informal areas after 201112. Yet, this expansion, both a hori-
zontal and vertical one, is considerable. It has resulted in the expansion 
of existing buildings (add-ons or extra storeys to legal or illegal build-
ings), the increase in illegal ex nihilo constructions, and an increase 
in collective modes of occupancy (squatters) of land and/or of vacant 
buildings. D. Sims showed, using superimposed aerial photographs, 
that from 2011 to 2012 the annual number of new constructions was 
4.5 times greater than from 2003 to 2011 in certain sub-districts of 
Giza (one of the three governorates of Greater Cairo)13. Once again, 
regarding Giza, M. Elshahed evokes a “senseless real estate promo-
tion”, which results from the division of agricultural land and its sale by 
bypassing land regulations and taxation, all in a record time in the total 
absence of control14. Meanwhile, the Governorate of Alexandria rec-
ognized that the number of buildings constructed without proper au-
thorization grew at an annual rate 2.5 times higher than prior to 2011.
11. Barthel, Jaglin, 2013.
12. The Ministry of Agriculture published in the press (Al-Ahram 6 March 
2013) the following information: since the revolution, 29,486 feddans (about 





Not only is informal urbanism said to have experienced a boom 
after the revolution15, revealing the capacity of “marginal” stakehold-
ers to take advantage of the current political luidity, but it also created 
new practices. In an ethnographic study of Manshiet Nasser, J. Furniss 
shows that those who built without permission (on a quarry) belong to 
the more afluent segments of the local population, which is largely 
poor and works recycling waste16. Furniss adds that, for these investors, 
illegality does not contradict with ambition to establish a new order in 
this district – considered by all urban elites as an archetype ashwaiyya 
(informal neighbourhood) – through the construction of good quality 
buildings with colourful facades.
Thus, the recent dynamics of these “popular neighbourhoods”17 
present informality as a diverse response to the failings of public policy 
in urban planning. They produce a very mixed urban development, 
belonging to what Bayat calls the “quiet encroachment” of ordinary 
citizens18.
PROFESSIONAL CIRCLES AND ASSOCIATIONS OF ARCHI-
TECTURE AND URBAN PLANNING DISRUPTED BY THE 
EMERGENCE OF NEW ACTIVISTS OF THE “URBAN CAUSE”
This transformation was possible by both the opening of the ield of 
activism – especially the appearance of the “street activism”19 after the 
revolution –, by the diversiication and pluralisation of civil society20, 
and, inally, by the existence of a stream of protests which preceded 
the revolution and contributed to ixing inhabitants’ expectations and 
framing their demands21. The number of organisations and collectives 
dedicated to the city has drastically increased after 2011. Through 
various means, they take action for the protection of public spaces, 
heritage and environment, but also for housing rights. While no com-
prehensive urban policy discourse has been able gain signiicant trac-
tion since 2011, these “urban activists” managed to politicize planning 
issues, engage in various struggles between people and the state and/
or the army, but also by making counter-proposals to oficial planning 
15. Let us recall here that informality in Egypt is certainly not a new pheno-





19. El Naggar, 2012.
20. Ben Neissa, 2011a.
21. See the article by A. Deboulet and B. Florin in this issue.
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on ad hoc websites22. More generally, the proliferation of spaces for 
debates, think tanks, exhibitions, blogs, and consulting irms dedicated 
to planning, are all examples of this appropriation or reinvention of 
public urban space by citizens who were long-time victims of authori-
tarian planning. On the Internet, new spaces give a voice to people to 
criticize government projects, and encourage people to rethink urban 
planning practices23.
We frequently speak of the takeover of the “urban issue” by players in 
Egyptian civil society. This its in a context of a global social movement 
that goes beyond the geographic scope of the Arab world and is 
accompanied by a resurgence of critical urban theories.24 The efforts of 
teachers and Egyptian practitioners to change perception surrounding 
careers in urban planning and architecture it perfectly into the rising 
trend of critical urban planning issues in the region.25
To discuss the role of the Egyptian urban players in this revolutionary 
context, along with academic experts, it was necessary that Egyptian 
urban actors contribute directly themselves. This is the case in two-
thirds of the contributions of this issue (mainly in parts 2 and 3), written 
by movers and shakers (urban planning professional, expert, consultant, 
activist, and even an entrepreneur) of the Egyptian urban debate26. In 
this issue, this debate is steered in three general directions.
22. Stadnicki, 2013.
23. See, for exemple, cairobserver.com, cairofrombelow.org, blog.shadow-
ministryofhousing.org, etc.
24. Busquet, 2013.
25. See the articles by N. Elhady and O. Nagati and H. Safey Eldeen in this 
issue.
26. This meeting between researchers and ield workers was made possible 
through the symposium organised by the CEDEJ in 2012 called “Revolts and 
transitions in the Arab world: towards a new urban agenda?” It focused on the 
urban dimension of the major changes currently affecting the Arab world, from 
the beginning of the revolutionary events of 2011 to the current experiences of 
democratization and conlict situations in which some societies of the area are 





RALLYING IN/FOR THE CITY
Proclaiming the city as a space meant for contestation and political 
openness, according to some authors27, is one of the most signiicant 
outcomes of the “Arab Spring”. Yet, urban protests in Egypt were born 
long before the 2011 revolution. A. Deboulet and B. Florin remind us 
in their article that the political revolution in Egypt is “the unexpected 
highlight of many social protests”, demanding more justice, “exhibiting 
themselves in central or outlying areas, but perceived by the dominant 
players as at the margins of the city”: strikes by textile workers and 
civil servants; gatherings of people from poor neighbourhoods against 
forced evictions; farmers on the islands of Cairo resisting against real 
estate projects; and zabaleen (garbage collectors/recyclers) against the 
privatization of waste collection, etc. These mobilizations, according 
to the authors, “take a highly political dimension which resembles the 
struggle for more citizenship”. Although met with unequal responses, 
these early mobilizations had the merit of setting the tone for the debate, 
and are now some of the mainstream “public problems” which was 
communicated through the channels of post-2011 social dissent and 
is now irmly rooted in the symbolism of revolutionary social protest.
How were these mobilizations relected in the “founding elections”28 
that took place in Egypt in 2011 and 2012? One might be surprised by 
the presence of R. Bianchi’s article in this issue, as it is more related 
the precedent edition of Egypte Monde Arabe on electoral sociology29. 
His stimulating and sometimes provocative analysis of the voting 
results teaches us that the deiant tendencies in urban areas are far 
from homogeneous. According to him, if the winning vote in favour of 
the Muslim Brotherhood (and their presidential candidate Mohamed 
Morsi) in the marginalized urban peripheries does indeed it into 
the revolutionary dynamic (through opposition to the former regime 
candidate, Ahmed Shaiq), this is not the case for the vote in the central 
districts and/or districts inhabited by the wealthier social classes. These, 
combined with the “foulouls” (leftovers) of the former regime, the Wafd 
party, the liberals, the secular, and Copts, are said to have been the 
source of the “counter-revolutionary” movement, which caused –with 
the support of the army– the overthrow of the irst democratically elected 
government in Egypt in the summer of 2013. R. Bianchi claims to ind 
a similar split at the national level between major cities on one side 
(mostly anti-Morsi), and the countryside and small towns on the other 
side (rather pro-Muslim Brotherhood). These divisions (both the urban/
countryside and centre/periphery) remain questionable, as they seem 





to be ephemeral and blurred in contemporary Egypt30. Nevertheless, 
as Bianchi states, the “Egypt’s revolutionary struggles were saturated 
with growing regional and class divisions that undermined any effort 
at political compromise”. According to the author, these divisions 
will persist, and, with time, will become more deep-seated, thereby 
complicating also the possibilities of territorial compromise on a 
regional and urban scale.
K. Ibrahim and D. Singerman show that the January 25 revolution 
has, more strongly than in the past, permitted some city dwellers to 
oppose government decisions they considered spatially and socially 
unjust and given them easier access to certain urban services. Their 
goal, through the Tadamun programme they created together31, is to 
connect and support all local self-management urban initiatives that 
emerged after the revolution, whether through the popular committees 
(Lajan Sha‘abiya) or in a more spontaneous manner. They would like 
these initiatives to form a new basis for local governance in Egypt (as 
was the case in Brazil), which is no longer represented in the central 
government since the dissolution of the local people’s councils in 2011.
Since 2011, engaged residents – whether through protests, elections, 
or self-governance initiatives – have been constantly reinventing public 
areas by developing new means of popular artistic expression, as 
shown with the development of grafiti on the walls of Cairo32. These 
artists vary their work according to the political whims of transition/
repression, equally talented in rendering works against a backdrop of 
urban revolt and “contested spaces”33 as they are with new forms of 
symbolic appropriation of the city.
CONTESTING URBAN POLICIES
Egyptian urban society seems to be affected by severe malfunctions. 
In part, the result of decades of political negligence helps up to 
understand the 2011 uprising. From this point of view, redeining urban 
policies to be catered towards the needs of urban dwellers will be an 
important step in Egypt’s political reconstruction and that of other Arab 
countries affected by the revolutionary phases. This explains the strong 
30. E. Denis, 2007, speaks of a “plethora of cities on the soil” which were 
developed mainly by the rural underclass. He also noted that 20% of “the 
urban” actually live in “urban villages” of more than 10,000 people – a phe-







involvement of certain players in the debate on spatial planning in the 
irst months after the revolution, as shown by R. A. Mahmoud and A. S. 
Abd Elrahman in their article. Like others before them, the authors note 
the failure of planning policies since the 1950s, “that do not correspond 
to the popular ways of inhabiting the territory”34. The authors see the year 
2011 as a “turning point for urban planning”. On the one hand, in 2011 
the government decided to abandon the controversial “Cairo 2050”, 
“urban dream of the old regime”, and replaced it partly with the “Egypt 
2052” master plan – less focused on the capital’s competitiveness than 
the idea of decentralization. On the other hand, alternative planning 
and development documents (Egypt Vision 2030, Egypt 712, etc.) have 
been developed by stakeholders from civil society by following the 
participative ideology that widely resurfaced with the revolution. While 
moderately innovative for some, and relatively utopian for others, these 
new projects nevertheless embody “a challenge to the former regime’s 
planning policy, and also to the planning policies undertaken by 
transitional governments since 2011”. In a way, the Egyptian revolution 
is also fought in the arenas of spatial planning.
Mr. Nada, meanwhile, using unique empirical material, gives a 
very precise account of the inapplicability of the urban regulations in 
force in Egypt. But the contribution of his work is even wider. Very 
knowledgeable on Egyptian institutions, he starts by identifying urban 
public action that he classes into three broad categories: policies limiting 
urban sprawl applied in the context of a long-term master plan; designing 
“blueprints” on the micro-urban scale to organise the development of a 
particular site; and the application of a betterment levy. He then shows 
that problems are not so much due to the political and legal instruments 
as to a series of governance issues. These problems (he mentions seven) 
originate primarily from the inability of various Egyptian governments 
to implement something other than “informal decentralization devoid 
of any political process”35. Mr Nada writes: “The lack of the government 
capacity to achieve intended outcomes from the policies investigated 
in this research cannot be understood without critical examination of 
the long history of centralization and its impact on actors’ behaviour at 
the different levels”. Mr. Nada’s argument is supported by the rhetoric 
of various oficial players (oficials from ministries, governorates, and 
the planning agency) who, in the context of the revolution and the 
freeing up of public speech, are extremely lucid and self-critical. These 
realizations call for urgent reform of territorial administration in Egypt.
In his sectoral approach dedicated to housing policy, Y. Shawkat 
raises another problem, that of continuing deicient public policies 
after the 2011 revolution, namely the “National Housing Programme” 
34. Denis, 2011.
35. Ben Neissa, 2011b.
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(Iskan Mubarak al- Qawmy) launched by Mubarak in the last years 
of his reign. Following what B. Florin has already noted, the failure 
of “abusive policies of so-called ‘social housing’” in Egypt since the 
“Nasserist cities” of the 1960s36, Shawkat shows, with supporting data, 
that the National Housing Programme has not achieved its stated 
goals. Despite a large number of housing units built in just a few years 
(around 380,000 units between 2005 and 2012), “the NHP has missed 
all of its social targets”, particularly in terms of accessibility, spatial 
distribution, habitability, and availability of services. According to the 
author, the main problem comes from a lawed governmental deinition 
of “low-income population”, to whom this project was meant to help 
the most. This deinition “excluded all those who have informal jobs, 
and embedded middle-income government employees”. These speciic 
mechanisms illustrate the general climate of ignorance towards the 
needs of the population and a housing policy primarily based on 
media hype. Finally, the author, known in Egypt for his activism in 
favour of housing rights, is concerned with the lack of questioning by 
the transitional governments of these selective methods for allocating 
subsidized housing despite the requirements in terms of “social justice” 
made   by the youth of Tahrir. He interprets this as evidence of the 
persistence of vote-catching and non-transparent political practices up 
to the highest levels of government.
CHANGING URBAN PLANNING PRACTICES
The th i rd part of the issue contains three contributions from 
practitioners, each with a speciic perspective on the urban revolutionary 
situation – from the universities where they teach, the consultancies and 
architectural irms they manage, or the activist organisations in which 
they participate. Here the authors dare to make concrete proposals for 
improving urban conditions in Egypt in light of recent political changes. 
K. Ibrahim reminds us with great modesty, that the new generation of 
player s  (to which he belongs) who are strongly committed to urban 
issues  in Egypt since the revolution, actually it into a current of 
thought born in the 1940s. The famous architect Hassan Fathy, author 
of the book Architecture for the Poor, is, according to Ibrahim, the irst 
Egyptian advocate of what he calls the “alternative urban development 
paradigm”. In other words, the practice of urban planning which is 
“socia l ly engaged, environmentally sensitive, and deeply rooted in 
Egypti a n culture”, such as K. Ibrahim claims, already characterized 
Fathy’s achievements, as well as those of a number of “against the tide” 
architects and planners of the 1970s and after. Thus, without belittling 




Ibrahim situates it in contemporary Egyptian history of urban resistance 
and “p a rticipatory urban planning”. Advocating a “more open, 
deliberative and accountable urban governance structure”, Takween, 
the consulting irm that Ibrahim manages37, aims to establish a link 
between policymakers and “local communities” to perpetuate the spirit 
of Hassan Fathy and resist top-down urban planning – apparently a 
constant from one transitional government to another.
The thr e e texts in this last section converge towards the same 
point: the urgent need to reconsider urban action toward popular and 
informal settlements, on which we mentioned above that they are a 
“normalized-margin” in urban Egypt. The article by N. Elhady and O. 
Nagati and then that of H. Safey Eldeen include a new and innovative 
programmatic dimension. As urban planning teachers in universities, 
the authors share their thoughts on pedagogy: for Elhady and Nagati, 
the est a blishment of planning workshops in the outskirts of Cairo; 
and for  Safey Eldeen, the design of a new focus on urban informal 
curriculum.
N. Elha d y and O. Nagati collected student proposals for 
neighbourhoods – in most cases popular and informal and usually where 
the students reside. The objective of this design studio, explain the authors, 
is to explore the potential of “local initiatives”38 in the development and 
legitim i zation of “citizen urban spaces”. This educational experience 
also al l ows its instigators to pose a pertinent question: “what would 
be the f uture position of architects and planners within such a luid 
socio-p o litical transformation, whereby the roles of state institutions, 
local c o mmunities, and other stakeholders, are being redeined and 
reconstituted?”
Heba Sa fey Eldeen, engages in a critique of the current teaching 
methods in Egypt. She condemns the “deterministic” attitude of some 
architecture schools who consider informal neighbourhoods as areas 
to be “ formalized” in order to conform them to their standard view 
of architecture. Thus, she seeks to modify the content of educational 
programmes within her university so that students internalize the “socio-
economic aspects” of informal settlements so as to develop working 
methods  that involve the concerned inhabitants. This relexive and 
self-critical approach to this ield of professional architecture and the 
teaching of architecture and urban planning is valuable in the context 
of questioning the established order in any professional environment.
To conclude, this issue of Egypte Monde Arabe highlights, among 
37. http://www.takween-eg.com/ 
38. These local initiatives are themselves presented as “excellent teaching 




others, two groups of actors to be reckoned with in Egypt: urban planners 
and development experts on one side, and the “civil society” (NGOs, 
activists, etc.) on the other. The former, who advocate a more engaged 
and inclusive urban planning approach, have the opportunity to work 
towards  rapprochement between experts and inhabitants in order to 
give meaning to the concept of participatory development beyond its 
“good practice” aspect carried by international organisations. In this 
context, the new Egyptian university programmes can deine a path to 
follow. The latter group, that of civil society and urban activists, will 
continue  to act as a bridge between the needs of residents and the 
structur e s of power (governmental and international donors – often 
acting in concert).
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